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LIABILITY OF PUBLIC UTILITY FOR TEMPORARY INTERRUPTION
OF SERVICE
National Food Stores, Inc. v. Union Electric Co.,
494 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)
Plaintiff food store chain brought an action1 to recover damages for
the value of perishable items that spoiled2 when defendant electric
utility temporarily discontinued service to customers in selected areas
as part of a plans to conserve power during a record heat wave.4 The
trial court set aside plaintiffs jury verdict on the ground -that there was
1. Plaintiff alleged a contractual relationship with the utility, but charged negli-
gence rather than breach of contract. Brief for Appellant at 9, 17, National Food
Stores, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 494 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Brief for Appellant]. Missouri courts have recognized the availability of an action in
either tort or contract for failure to deliver where a utility knew of the customer's
particular need for electricity and had assured him of a continuous supply. Ellyson
v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933). This choice
allows for greater damages under the "proximate cause" standard of negligence than
by attempting to prove "contemplation of the parties" to recover for the spoilage. 5
A. CORBIN, CorTRcrs 75 (1964); W. PROSSER, T E LAW OF TORTS 619-20 (4th ed.
(1971); see Bromer v. Florida Power & Light Co., 45 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1949); Hip-
pard Coal Co. v. Illinois Power & Light Corp., 317 Il1. App. 47, 45 N.E.2d 701 (1942).
2. On appeal, plaintiff restricted its claim to loss of those perishables which could
have been protected by a one- or two-hour advance notice. Brief for Appellant at 1-
5. The court, however, found there was sufficient evidence for a jury to award dam-
ages for loss of sales and excess labor costs. 494 S.W.2d at 384-85.
3. 494 S.W.2d at 381 (referring to information found in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1).
Union Electric's "Emergency Load Reduction or Power Curtailment" plan provided for:
(Phase One) Disconnecting service to customers with interruptable con-
tracts;
(Phase Two) A 5% voltage reduction;
(Phase Three) Contacting the two-hundred largest industrial consumers,
and requesting that they voluntarily reduce their power
consumption;
(Phase Four) A general notice to the public through the media;
(Phase Five) Involuntary curtailment of service periodically to certain
specified geographical areas throughout the entire St.
Louis metropolitan area.
The plan reflects a general preference for residential and commercial customers
over industrial users. 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 243
(1969) [hereinafter cited as PRunsT].
4. The St. Louis area had experienced continuous hot weather for several weeks,
with the temperature exceeding 100 degrees for four days preceding the shut-off. St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, July 12, 1966, at 1, col. 4.
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no basis for legal liability. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed
and held: A utility must give reasonable advance notice of anticipated
service shut-offs to protect customers from foreseeable loss or harm.5
A public utility's duty to use reasonable care6 in providing adequate7
and continuous service9 to its customers arises from a voluntary ac-
5. National Food Stores, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 494 S.W.2d 379, 383-84 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1973). On a separate issue the court held that a jury might differentiate
between the utility's duty to give general notice of the anticipated interruption and a
duty to give specific notice of the shut-off to those customers who had been assured an
advance warning by a Union Electric sales representative. The court did not suggest,
however, that a breach of one duty would require a more substantial showing than the
other, although it did note the necessity of proving damage causation for recovery under
either duty. Id. at 385.
6. Courts have required utilities to exercise reasonable care and diligence in pro-
viding service. Langley v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 41 Cal. 2d 655, 262 P.2d 849
(1953); Bromer v. Florida Power & Light Co., 45 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1949); Bissel v.
Eastern Ill. Util. Co., 222 Ill. App. 408, 415 (1921); Humphreys v. (Qentral Ky. Na-
tural Gas Co., 190 Ky. 733, 739-41, 229 S.W. 117, 119-20 (1920); Henneke v. Gascon-
ade Power Co., 236 Mo. App. 100, 152 S.W.2d 667 (1941); Oklahoma Natural Gas
Co. v. Pack, 186 Okla. 330, 97 P.2d 768 (1939). But see Kohler v. Kansas Power
& Light Co., 192 Kan. 226, 387 P.2d 149 (1963) (highest degree of care in ren-
dering service). This duty to supply is usually distinguished from the duty to protect
the public during production and use of the service, where the utility is charged with
knowledge of the dangerous characteristics of the electricity or gas and the standard
of care is higher. Caraglio v. Frontier Power Co., 192 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1951);
Brown v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 236 F. Supp. 815 (D.D.C. 1964); Donovan v.
Union Elec. Co., 454 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
7. Courts have recognized liability when a utility provides inadequate service.
Telluride Power Co. v. Williams, 172 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1949) (inadequate trans-
formers prevented machines from operating); Tallopoosa River Elec. Co-op v. Burns,
271 Ala. 435, 124 So. 2d 672 (1960) (insufficient voltage to heat chicken breeder);
Curry v. Norwood Elec. Light & Power Co., 125 Misc. 279, 211 N.Y.S. 441 (St. Law-
rence County Ct. 1925) (secondary source did not provide sufficient electricity to satis-
factorily operate movie theater).
The standard for adequacy depends upon the types of service rendered and the needs
of the customers served. It does not necessarily mean the highest quality of service
but rather reasonable service. A. & T. Motor Freight v. Public Util. Comm'n, 125
Ohio St. 617, 619, 184 N.E. 11, 12 (1932); Colonial Prods. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub.
Util. Comm'n, 188 Pa. Super. 163, 146 A.2d 657 (1958). See also Revision of Serv.
Rules for Elec. Util., 40 P.U.R. (n.s.) 99, 104 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1941); E.
JONES & T. BrGHAm, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIc UTILITIES 390 (1932); 1 PRIEST 234-35;
Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and En-
forcement, 62 COLuM. L. REv. 312 (1962).
8. Cox v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 150 So. 863 (La. App. 1933); see Ala-
bama Power Co. v. Henson, 238 Ala. 348, 191 So. 379 (1939); Arkansas Power &
Light Co. v. Abboud, 204 Ark. 808, 164 S.W.2d 1000 (1942); City of Gainesville v.
Gainesville Gas & Elec. Power Co., 65 Fla. 404, 62 So. 919 (1913).
9. This general duty has been defined and included in state statutes: ALA. CoDE
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ceptance of a public franchise, 10 express or implied contracts," and
the law of negligence.' 2 Courts have recognized, however, that a util-
tit. 10, § 187 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.291 (1970); ARuZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-321 (1956); ARK. SrAT. ANN. § 73-204(b) (1957); CAL. Pun. UTIL. CODE § 451
(Deering 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 115-3-1 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26,
§ 135 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-301 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 366.03 (1968);
IDAHO CODE 61-302 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, § 32 (Smith-Hurd 1966);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-1-2-69 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-107 (1972); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 278.030 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 51 (1964); Miss, CODE ANN.
§ 77-3-33 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 393.130(1) (Supp. 1974); MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. § 70-105 (1947); NEV. REv. STAT. § 704.040 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
374:1 (1966); N.J. REv. STAT. § 48:2-23 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 68-6-2
(1961); N.Y. TRANSP. CORP. § 12 (McKinney Supp. 1973); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4905.22 (Page 1953); PA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1171 (1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 39-2-1 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-414 (1955); TEX. REv. Cxv. STAT. ANN.
art. 1446a (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-3-1 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-234 (Supp.
1973); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 80.28.010 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-1
(1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.03 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 37-62 (1959).
The Pennsylvania statute, for example, provides:
Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and
reasonable service and facilities.... Such service also shall be reasonably
continuous and without unreasonable interruptions or delay.
10. A franchise has traditionally signified the special privileges granted to a utility,
allowing it to provide necessary service to the public in a designated area without com-
petition. The utility's acceptance of these privileges establishes reciprocal rights in the
public. See, e.g., City of Gainesville v. Gainesville Gas & Elec. Power Co., 65 Fla. 404,
410, 62 So. 919, 921 (1913); State ex rel. Hairline v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 343 S.W.2d
177 (Mo. CL App. 1961); Danna v. Consolidated Edison Co., 71 Misc. 2d 1029, 377
N.Y.S.2d 722 (App. Div. 1972); Brewer v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 33 Misc. 2d 1015,
1019, 228 N.Y.S.2d 177, 182 (Queens County Sup. Ct. 1962); Curry v. Norwood Elec.
Light & Power Co., 125 Misc. 279, 282, 211 N.Y.S. 441, 444 (St. Lawrence County Ct.
1925); Preston County Light & Power Co. v. Rennick, 145 W. Va. 115, 113 S.E.2d 378
(1960); Village of Little Valley, 22 P.U.R. (n.s.) 63 (N.Y. Dep't of Pub. Serv 1938);
E. NICHOLS, PUBLIC UTILrrY SERVICE AND DIsCRIMINATION 138 (1928); 10. POND, TREA-
TISE ON LAWS OF PUBLIC UTLrrInEs § 254 (4th ed. 1932); 1 PRIEST 230-31; A. WnnER,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTmr.Ty REGULATION 101 (1941).
11. Coal Dist. Power*Co. v. Katy Coal Co., 141 Ark. 337, 217 S.W. 449 (1919);
Langley v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 41 Cal. 2d 655, 661, 262 P.2d 846, 849 (1953);
Humphreys v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co., 190 Ky. 733, 229 S.W. 117 (1920) (re-
versed on question of duty to notify supplier of the breach); Lund v. Princeton, 250
Minn. 472, 479, 85 N.W.2d 197, 203 (1957); Heirs v. South Carolina Power Co., 198
S.C. 280, 285, 17 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1941).
12. The duty is imposed by law, apart from statutes or contracts; it requires the
utility which holds itself out to serve the public to exercise reasonable diligence and
care towards its customers. Langley v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 41 Cal. 2d 655, 660-
61, 262 P.2d 846, 849 (1953) (dictum); Kohler v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 192
Kan. 226, 229, 387 P.2d 149, 151 (1963); Ellyson v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 59
S.W.2d 714, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933); Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa
Grower's Ass'n, 67 N.M. 108, 116, 353 P.2d 62, 67 (1960); Oklahoma Natural Gas
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ity is "not an insurer of constant electric service,"'1 3 and have relieved
utilities from providing service during necessary shut-offs for repairs 4
and emergencies,' 5 and during interruptions beyond their reasonable
control. 16  Nevertheless, these excused interruptions do not suspend
Co. v. Pack, 186 Okla. 330, 333, 97 P.2d 768, 770 (1939); Chrome Plating Co. v.
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 241 Wis. 554, 562, 6 N.W.2d 692, 695 (1942); cf. 1938
Wis. L REv. 182, 183.
13. Henneke v. Gasconade Power Co., 236 Mo. App. 100, 112, 152 S.W.2d 667,
673 (1941); accord, Waukesha Gas & Elec. Co. v. Waukesha Motor Co., 190 Wis. 462,
209 N.W. 590 (1926).
In the absence of express contracts, courts have generally placed the burden on plain-
tiffs to show that the proximate cause of the failure to provide required service was the
fault of the utility. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Western Pub. Serv. Co., 142 F.2d
857 (10th Cir. 1944); Senderoff v. Housatonic Pub. Serv. Co., 147 Conn. 18, 20, 156
A.2d 517, 518 (1959); Milford Canning Co. v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 39 Il1. App.
2d 258, 188 N.E.2d 397 (1963). But see Bearden v. Lyntegar Elec. Coop., 454 S.W.2d
885, 887-88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (court recognized plaintiff's prima facie case of
negligence under res ipsa loquitur and held that it was the utility's duty to refute that
it was the cause of electrical interruption).
14. Telluride Power Co. v. Williams, 172 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1949); Davis v.
Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (dictum); Stroup v. Alabama Power Co.,
316 Ala. 290, 292, 113 So. 18, 20 (1927); Brame v. Light, Heat & Water Co., 95
Miss. 26, 48 So. 728 (1909); Chrome Plating Co. v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 241
Wis. 554, 6 N.W.2d 692 (1942); see Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Abboud, 204
Ark. 808, 164 S.W.2d 1000 (1942). See also Metropolitan Club v. Consolidated Edi-
son Co., 276 App. Div. 1061, 96 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1950) (Public Service Commission
should determine the reasonableness of the time fixed for temporary discontinuance
during repairs).
15. The conditions must make it reasonably necessary to shut off power to safeguard
utility or public and shut-off must not be done arbitrarily or as a result of util-
ity negligence. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Carolina Peanut Co., 186 F.2d 816 (4th
Cir. 1951); see Mullen v. Otter Tail Power Co., 130 Minn. 386, 153 N.W. 746
(1915); Carroway v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 226 S.C. 237, 84 S.E.2d 728 (1954).
See generally Collins, The Outage that Was a Blockbuster, 66 PUn. Urnm. FORT. 234,
241 (1960); Note, Blackout of Interconnected Electric Power Companies: Recovery and
Prevention Measures, 53 MmNN. L. Rxv. 162 (1968).
16. The most commonly recognized excuses for non-delivery of service are acts of
God. These acts or occurrences must be so extraordinary and unanticipated that they
could not have been foreseen or prevented by the utility's exercise of reasonable care.
Curry v. Norwood Elec. Light & Power Co., 125 Misc. 279, 211 N.Y.S. 441 (St. Law-
rence County Ct. 1925) (low river from closing of dam foreseeable by prudent man);
see note 31 infra and accompanying text. They must be the cause of the interruption
and may not involve negligence by the utility. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. West-
em Pub. Serv. Co., 142 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1944) (lightning); Arkansas Power & Light
Co. v. Abboud, 204 Ark. 808, 164 S.W.2d 1000 (1942) (ice storm, lightning); Florida
Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 154 Fla. 638, 18 So. 2d 671 (1944) (hurricane);
Ellyson v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933) (ice
storm); Barnet v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 222 N.Y. 195, 118 N.E. 625 (1918)
(flood); Southern Ry. v. Cohen Weenen & Co., 156 Va. 313, 157 S.E. 563 (1931) (rain
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/9
348 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:344
the utility's duty to exercise reasonable diligence in serving the pub-
liC.17  Knowledge of an interruption requires the utility to promptly
locate and correct any disruptions,' 8 or provide alternate supplies if
available. 19 In contrast to the advance notice required before per-
manently abandoning service,20 utilities have been required to notify
customers of temporary interruptions only when the interruptions were
planned, 'the particular customer's needs were known, and notice to
the customer was shown to have been possible. 2'
storm); cf. Sauer v. Rural Co-op Power Ass'n, 225 Minn. 356, 31 N.W.2d 15 (1948)
(wrongful death action where lightning knocked uninsulated wire onto customer's house;
utility's "act of God" defense unavailable if utility was negligent).
Strikes by employees of the customer or utility may prevent the service from being
provided, but the utility is required to use every effort to settle the dispute. Kuhlman
Plastics Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 400 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1966); Oakland
v. Key System Transit Lines, 1 P.U.R.3d 150, 157 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1953); 1
PRmsT 237; Note, supra note 7, at 322-23.
17. The utility's undertaking to serve the public creates an obligation to exercise
care in operating its system to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to its customers. Tem-
porary and unavoidable interruptions in service may be excused, but negligent acts or
omissions which cause foreseeable harm are not. Langley v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.,
41 Cal. 2d 655, 262 P.2d 846 (1953); Florida Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee,
154 Fla. 638, 646, 18 So. 2d 671, 675 (1944); accord, Ellyson v. Missouri Power &
Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933); General Tel. Co., 44 P.U.R.3d 241, 244
(Fla. R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n 1962).
18. Krier Preserving Co. v. West Bend Hearing & Lighting Co., 198 Wis. 595, 225
N.W. 200 (1929); see Homes v. Monongahela Power Co., 136 W. Va. 877, 69 S.E.2d
131 (1952). See also E. JoNEs & T. BIGHAM, supra note 7, at 420.
19. Ellyson v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933)
(electric company liable for failure to maintain alternative source as represented).
20. Although abandonment and temporary discontinuance or interruptions necessar-
ily differ in duration, the nature of a public utility and its duty to provide for the pub-
lic convenience evidence similar considerations in the regulation of all discontinu-
ances. A utility undertaking to provide service creates a public reliance and expecta-
tions that the service will be adequate and will continue as long as needed by its
customers. When conditions change and a utility seeks to abandon service, it must first
receive the approval of the public service commission by showing the utility no longer
has a franchise or authority to serve, public demand is minimized, a shortage of sup-
plies exists, operation is at substantial economic loss, or that the customers have not met
the necessary conditions precedent. A utility must then give reasonable advance notice
so alternative service may be found and injury minimized. Atlanta Power Co., 65
P.U.R.3d 269 (Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n 1966); Valley Mercantile Corp., 6 P.U.R.
(n.s.) (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1934). Merely furnishing public notice of such
abandonment is not sufficient; the utility must still obtain public service commission
approval. Department of Pub. Util. v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry., 327 Mass. 450, 99
N.E.2d 462 (1951).
21. In Langley v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 41 Cal. 2d 655, 262 P.2d 846, 850
(1953), a leading case, the court held that when the utility knew of the customer's
dependence on electricity to operate his fish hatchery, and had assured the customer
Washington University Open Scholarship
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An earlier Missouri decision, Ellyson v. Missouri Power & Light
Co.," had recognized a utility's tort liability for not exercising sufficient
care in providing continuous electrical service. The National Food
Stores court cited statutory support23 for a utility's general duty "to avoid
that he would be given prompt notification of all interruptions, failure to telephone
plaintiff of a known interruption was a breach of contract and a tort. In parts of the
case not referred to by the National Food Stores court, the Langley court limited its
holding to the immediate circumstances, where the utility had shown ability to notify
the customer of the interruption and the loss was foreseeable if he was not notified
in time to take emergency measures to save his fish. Id. at 663, 262 P.2d at 851. But
see Stroup v. Alabama Power Co., 216 Ala. 290, 113 So. 18 (1927), where the Alabama
Supreme Court dismissed a negligence action by a customer whose wife was being op-
erated on in her home at 2 a.m. when the electricity was intentionally shut off to make
necessary repairs. The court stated that it was common knowledge that the utility
could not have notified all affected customers of a temporary suspension of the sup-
ply of current and it was unreasonable to impose this duty except where the facts indi-
cated that the utility had knowledge of the plaintiff's need for service. Id. at 292, 113 So.
at 20. Tort actions against water utilities for failure to notify customers of temporary
interruptions have also been dismissed when the utility did not have knowledge of the
customer's type of equipment and damage caused by the shut-off was unforseeable.
Brame v. Light, Heat & Water Co., 95 Miss. 26, 48 So. 728 (1909). One state com-
mission has held that a rule permitting a water company to shut off service "for any
purpose at any time," is unreasonable unless it requires that notice be given to all cus-
tomers affected by the shut-off. Valley Util. Co., 73 P.U.R.3d 41, 45 (Ohio Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1968). Gas utilities have been consistently required to notify all customers
of planned or unavoidable interruptions because of the inherently dangerous quality of
gas, of which the utility is charged with knowledge. Streck v. St. Louis County Gas
Co., 58 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933); Beyer v. Consolidated Gas Co., 44 App. Div.
158, 60 N.Y.S. 628 (1899); Cramer v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 45 Misc. 2d
670, 257 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Albany County Ct. 1965); Hoehle v. Allegheny Heating Co.,
5 Pa. Super. 21 (1897).
22. 59 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933). The defendant utility had established a
contractual relationship with a chicken hatchery by assuring it that a standby plant would
be maintained. An ice storm prevented delivery of electrical service from the primary
plant, and the court held that a negligence action was equally available where the power
was interrupted for over five hours because the utility had exercised insufficient care
to maintain the secondary source. Id. at 716-17.
23. The court referred to Mo. Rv. STAT. § 393.130(1) (1969):
Every ...electrical corporation ... shall furnish and provide such service
instrumentalities and facilities as shall be safe and adequate and in all respects
just and reasonable ....
This statute defines the duty which the state Public Service Commission imposes on
the utility to continue serving the public, but the National Food Stores court did not
recognize this as a limit and suggested that violation of the stautory provision gives rise
to a claim by a third party. 494 S.W.2d at 382. The Public Service Commission uses
this provision not to award damages to the members of the public, but to impose sanc-
tions on the utility. Roach v. Danciger & Co., 4 Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 650, 656
(1917), rev'd on other grounds, 275 Mo. 483, 205 S.W. 36 (1918). The Illinois Supreme
Court interpreted a similar statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, § 32 (Smith-Hurd
349
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undue harm to its customers,"24 but expanded Ellyson 'by relying on
a California case, Langley v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.25 Langley im-
posed on utilities a specific duty to exercise reasonable diligence to
notify a customer of an actual interruption where the customer's de-
pendence on electrical service was known26 and the utility had evi-
denced its ability to notify.27  The California court stated that a utility
was under no duty to ascertain possible loss to all customers, and "[i]n
absence of the particular needs of a customer, a utility is not required
to give notice of a power failure. '28
The defendant electric utility in National Food Stores was well
aware of the record heat wave and the company's inability to satisfy
the increased demand for power.29  Thus, the planned shut-off3 ° was
1966), and determined that a showing of a statutory violation was insufficient to support
a negligence action for failure to provide electrical service. The court required proof of
a duty of due care, negligence, and proximate cause. The court thus suggested that
the statute did not properly supplement the utility's duty toward the public. Milfred
Canning Co. v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 39 Ill. App. 2d 258, 265, 188 N.E.2d 397,
400-01 (1963).
The National Food Stores court's reference to statutory support would have been
more appropriate under a stronger provision, such as Tax. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1446a(1) (1962), where the state policy is clearly expressed:
"Utilities" as herein defined are dedicated to the service of the public, and the
primary duty of such a utility, its management and employees, is the main-
tenance of continuous and adequate service at all times in order that the safety
and health of the people may be protected against the danger inherent in the
disruption or cessation of such service. All courts and all administrative
agencies of this state are enjoined to recognize this policy and in particular,
to interpret and to apply this Act in accordance with such policy.
24. 494 S.W.2d at 382.
25. 41 Cal. 2d 655, 262 P.2d 846 (1953).
The court in Ellyson recognized the utility's duty, as discussed in National Food
Stores, to avoid undue harm to its customers during an excused interruption. The
earlier Missouri decision had required the utility to resume service power within a rea-
sonable time to a particular customer whose needs and probable damages were within the
contemplation of the parties. Ellyson v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 714,
716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933). National Food Stores defined negligence as including both
unexcused interruptions and failure to give advance notice to enable customers to avoid
reasonably foreseeable damages as a result of anticipated service interruptions. 494
S.W.2d at 383-84.
26. Langley v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 41 Cal. 2d 655, 661-62, 262 P.2d 846,
850 (1953).
27. Id. at 661-62, 262 P.2d at 850.
28. Id. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
29. The heat wave had been putting heavy demands on the utility for weeks and
when the situation became extremely intense, the utility put its "Emergency Load Re-
duction or Power Curtailment Plan" into effect at 7:55 a.m. on July 11, 1966, by
discontinuing service to customers with interruptable contracts. By 10:00 a.m. the elec-
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properly characterized by the court as an anticipated, unavoidable in-
terruption, 31 rather than an unforeseeable disruption caused by an
"act of God." It was undisputed that the utility acted reasonably in
rationing the power supply and 'that it exercised due diligence in re-
storing service to its customers." The court's determination of a -legal
duty to give reasonable advance notice of anticipated interruptions
avoided discussion of the utility's argument that it was impossible to
give meaningful notice to the more than 100,000 customers affected
by the shut-off;33 whether the notice requirement has been met in a
trical demand had exceeded 3,000 megawatts, the amount used during the peak demand
in the previous year, and was within 290 megawatts of capacity. The utility then be-
gan telephoning the 200 largest industrial consumers and completed this phase by
12:30 p.m. These telephone calls were to request voluntary reductions in consump-
tion and were neither warnings nor notifications of an anticipated outage. The court
reasoned that the initiation of its emergency plan indicated the utility's awareness of
the critical situation and that involuntary curtailment, as provided in the plan, might
be necessary. Brief for Appellant at 2-3.
30. After omitting Phase Four of its Emergency Plan, Union Electric began dis-
connecting a number of electrical feeders serving the public. 494 S.W.2d at 381; cf.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 11, 1973, at 8, col. 4. Union Electric's president had
telephoned the Public Service Commission before putting the sectional shut-off into ef-
fect and the Commission agreed that this was the best course to follow.
31. The court determined that the utility had no control over the inadequate supply
of power during this heat wave, but recognized that plaintiff's claim was not for discon-
tinuance of service. 494 S.W.2d at 382. An ingredient of the requisite "reasonable
care" to provide adequate service would include proper planning to meet foreseeable
or contemplated changes in consumer demand. Curry v. Norwood Elec. Light & Power
Co., 125 Misc. 279, 211 N.Y.S. 441 (St. Lawrence County Ct. 1925) (electric utility
could have anticipated insufficient power supplies if upstream dam was closed and should
have made provision for alternative source to give service when desired by public); see
Lukrawka v. Spring Valley Water Co., 169 Cal. 318, 146 P. 640 (1915) (utility obli-
gated to anticipate reasonable growth of needs and have sufficient supplies to meet rea-
sonable demands of public); Note, Blackout of Interconnected Electric Power Compa-
nies, 53 MINN. L. REV. 162 (1968) (suggesting a utility could be held liable for inade-
quate planning); cf. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 12, 1973, at 1, col. 7 (reporting a
Union Electric spokesman declared that primary reason for shortage which caused the
events in National Food Stores was incompletion of an additional plant due to skilled
labor shortage).
32. 494 S.W.2d at 382.
33. The court superficially distinguished the utility's additional argument that its
filed tariff limited the extent of the company's liability. Id. at 384.
The Missouri Supreme Court has held that when a telephone company filed a reason-
able tariff, and the utility did not act willfully, intentionally, or maliciously, its liability
is the amount of the customer's actual impairment, and in no event is the liability to
exceed the amount paid for services. The court recognized that the weight of authority
viewed the tariff as becoming part of the law once it is filed, regardless of whether
the customer knew of the tariff. Warner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 428 S.W.2dhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/9
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particular case is left to the jury. 4 Moreover, the court did not re-
quire a showing that the utility had specific knowledge of plaintiffs
susceptibility to damage before imposing a duty to notify. This sug-
gests that a utility may be liable for reasonably foreseeable damages
to all customers injured during the shut-off.85
596, 601 (Mo. 1968). Courts have reasoned that the strict regulation of the rights
and privileges of a utility or public carrier in the public interest warrant the regulation
of liabilities, for they at least indirectly affect the rate structure. Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. 566, 571 (1921); Warner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co,,
supra.
The National Food Stores court failed to deal directly with the Warner decision and
instead noted the difference between telephone and electric utilities. The tariff filing
provisions for the former are mandatory, while the latter may file. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 392.200 (1969) (telephone); id. § 393.140(11) (electric utility); see 494 S.W.2d at
384. The pertinent fact, that the Public Service Commission had accepted the defend-
ant's tariff, was not dealt with by the court. A distinction between negligent disruption
and negligent failure to warn of interruptions and shut-offs is superficial. It fails to
deal with the policy reasons for limiting liability through approved tariffs, which are su-
pervised by a commission charged with the public interest and empowered to ensure this
end. See id.
34. The court did not discuss the requirements of "reasonable notice," except to
imply that a notice to the media was required. 494 S.W.2d at 384-85.
During the power shortage, the utility maintained service through as many electrical
feeders as the capacity of the system would allow. The demand for electricity was con-
stantly fluctuating and the utility could not precisely predict how many feeders would
have to be disconnected to prevent a system overload. Union Electric argued, there-
fore, that it was impossible to give the one- or two-hour warning which plaintiff had
pleaded as being necessary to prevent spoilage. Brief for Respondent at 4, National Food
Stores, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 494 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Brief for Respondent].
The burden of the power shortage was shifted throughout the St. Louis area during
the two-day period by rotating the feeders to be disconnected on two- to three-hour
intervals. While there were indications that the general geographic areas to be affected
had been predetermined, Union Electric argued that the extensive interlacing of the
electrical feeders in the neighborhoods, see note 21 supra, prevented the utility from
giving a meaningful advance warning through public media of the specific customers
to be affected. This message would have been confusing to the public and would have
been an open invitation to the criminal element to plunder the unprotected area. Brief
for Respondent at 4-5. See also St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 12, 1966, at 1, col. 4.
But see Collins, supra note 15, at 240-41 (power cut off without notice to over one-
half million New York residents; reported crime dropped 50% when police took pre-
ventive measures).
Union Electric argued that it would have been impossible to give individual notice to
the more than 100,000 customers affected and rejected plaintiff's contention that the util-
ity's ability to telephone its largest customers during Phase Three indicated a capacity
to notify the other customers prior to Phase Five of its Emergency Plan. Brief for Re-
spondent at 4-5.
35. See 494 S.W.2d at 383, 384.Washington University Open Scholarship
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The significance of National Food Stores should not be minimized,
since power shortages are common. The expansion of the utility's
standard of reasonable care to include notification of anticipated shut-
offs is a proper ingredient of the obligation to exercise diligence in
minimizing inconvenience and injury during temporary interruptions. 36
The potential difficulty presented by National Food Stores is whether
future courts will be able to instruct juries without subjecting utilities
to liability in every instance. 3 7
The court disposed of the utility's second argument that plaintiff's action was request-
ing discrimination in service by extending the notice obligation to all customers simi-
larly situated. Id. at 384. No case cited or found goes this far, but the assertion is
a logical extension of the court's new interpretation of the general duty to prevent harm
to the utility's customers. Humphreys v. Central Ky. Natural Gas, 190 Ky. 733, 229
S.W. 117 (1920), is the leading case stating that utilities cannot give special treatment
to some customers to the detriment of others. The case recognizes a utility's implied
obligation to render service within the reasonable contemplation of the parties:
We do not, of course, mean to say that a gas company is under an absolute
duty to furnish each or any of its customers the precise quantity of gas . . .
needed . . . , because it might not be reasonable or practicable for it to do
this without discrimination ... . Public service corporations.. must treat
all customers alike.
Id. at 740, 229 S.W. at 120. The National Food Stores court's reference to a utility
as a unique monopoly, a supplier of an indispensable service, highlights the extension
of the expanded notice obligation as being non-discriminatory, and within the best in-
terests of the community which the utility is allowed to serve. 494 S.W.2d at 383.
See 1 0. POND, LAW OF PUBLIC UTiLrrMsS § 270 (4th ed. 1932); 1 PRIEST 228.
36. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
37. The lower court in National Food Stores had instructed the jury that it could
find for plaintiff if it found the utility interrupted plaintiffs electrical service without
first giving reasonable notice. Brief for Respondent at 17-18. Meaningful guidelines
for the proper determination of reasonable advance notice are absent from the opinion.
Perhaps the Public Service Commission could best determine whether the utility was
"reasonably" fulfilling its duty to the public in light of all the surrounding circum-
stances.
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